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Abstract 
 
The concept of corporate governance has been dealt with by a very large number of authors 
from different perspectives but the main theme that runs across all the published work is 
easily identifiable - that corporate governance is the real panacea for bad management of 
organisations.  The thesis propounded by these authors, proceeds on the assumption that 
corporate governance is an absolute concept and can be easily implemented by institutions, 
both profit-making and non-profit making.  This research aims at establishing that the 
concept of corporate governance could be employed by public entities and non-profit making 
entities differently. Profit-making organisations will conduct their businesses with a view to 
maximizing their profits and in doing so they may be required to compromise the 
requirements of corporate governance, whereas the concept may be successfully 
implemented by non-profit making organisations.  This research has developed this idea by 
means of empirical studies and it also concludes that all organisations must go through a 
preparatory stage for a successful implementation of corporate governance and that there is 
a correlation between corporate governance and democratic governance of institutions  
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Introduction 
The introductory chapter discusses the background to the study, the problem 
statement, the objectives, the research questions and the scope and limitations of 
this study. 
Chapter 1 examines the concept of corporate governance and looks at some of the 
definitions of corporate governance, features/principles of corporate governance and 
the differences between corporate governance and corporate management. 
Chapter 2 looks at boards’ composition within both sectors, and examines their 
similarities and differences. Discussion is made of the primary objectives of profit 
making organisation, comparing those objectives with that of non-profit making 
organisations generally.  This research looks at some of the difficulties in 
implementing corporate governance by profit making organisations and identifies 
some of the strengths of non-profit making organisations in implementing corporate 
governance. 
Chapter 3 looks at corporate governance in practice, citing examples of departures 
from corporate governance within the financial sector. In addition, the research will 
discuss why the implementation of corporate governance may be possible by public 
entities and non-profit organisations; and the role of public awareness in corporate 
governance.             
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Background to the study 
The background to this research looks at the importance of corporate governance in 
today’s business environment. 
With the recent collapse of several high-profile corporations such as Barings Bank, 
WorldCom and Enron to name but a few, and the given reasons behind such 
collapse as bad corporate governance, there has been renewed interest in this topic. 
Public awareness has increased regarding the importance of good corporate 
governance in the ways corporations are managed and controlled.  Among the 
issues raised are: who should be allowed to participate in corporate governance, to 
whether other stakeholders should play a more active role in the process. Concerns 
regarding corporate governance transcend national borders affecting all types of 
organisations and industries worldwide within the public and private sector, and deal 
with diverse issues ranging from ownership and control to accountability of its 
members. 
Its objectives are (i) to enhance the performance and ensure conformity of 
corporations; and (ii) facilitate and stimulate the performance of corporations, 
resulting in the generation of economic wealth of the organisation and society. 
Good corporate governance aims to also establish a system whereby the business 
ethics of managers can be monitored to ensure corporate accountability and, at the 
same time, cost-effectively protect the interests of investors and society alike.  It can 
also serve as a “best practice” guide to what is considered to be acceptable 
behaviour and ensuring corporations comply with those standards. 
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Corporate governance is in essence the governance of corporations. It is conducive 
to national development.  Many case studies show that it plays an immensely 
important role in increasing the flow of financial capital to organisations in developing 
and developed countries.  Good corporate governance is also important in securing 
benefits to overcoming barriers, including the actions of vested interested groups 
and for achieving and sustaining productivity and growth. 
Improved corporate governance is not abstract, but must be considered in light of the 
country’s financial sectors, its competition policy and the regulatory reforms of the 
specific sectors. 
Those who are in favour of improved corporate governance include private and 
public investors and members of the general public, as well as the players in 
international portfolio equity flows to corporations in the countries affected.   
Those against improving corporate governance include those giving “lip service” to 
the need for improvement, among which are dominant shareholders and corporate 
bodies (both in the private and public sectors).  Their concerns are primarily client-
based relationships (as opposed to rules-based systems of governance). 
Essentially, good corporate governance requires good political governance, and 
vice–versa.1 
Other studies in corporate governance have looked at different areas, however very 
limited research has been carried out in this particular area. 
 
                                                            
1C.P, Oman Corporate Governance and National Development, OECD Development Centre 
Working Paper No. 180, OECD Publishing Development, 2001, doi: 
10.1787/11353558826. 
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Statement of the problem 
The implementation of corporate governance has been fraught with various 
challenges adversely affecting the characteristics of good corporate governance:  
Democracy; Accountability, Fairness and Transparency 
It has been argued that failure to effectively implement corporate governance, 
especially in the financial sector has in some way contributed to the current financial 
crisis being faced globally. Therefore this study argues that corporate governance 
has not successfully been implemented in profit-making organisations. 
The objectives of the study  
This study examines: 
1. The importance of corporate governance in the effective management of 
organisations. 
2. The key elements of corporate governance 
3. How effectively corporate governance has been implemented by profit-making 
organisations. 
4. How effectively non-profit making organisations have implemented corporate 
governance. 
5. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of corporate governance by 
profit-making organisations. 
 Research questions 
1. What is the importance of corporate governance in the effective management 
of organisations? 
9 
 
2. What are some of the key elements of corporate governance? 
3. How effectively has corporate governance been implemented by profit making 
organisations? 
4. How effectively has corporate governance been implemented by non-profit 
making organisations? 
5. What are some of the key challenges in the implementation of corporate 
governance by the profit making organisations? 
Methodology 
This study is desktop research-based, using documentary evidence gathered from 
various sources including coursework, an interview with Dr Roger Barker, Head of 
Corporate of Governance, Institute of Directors, books, reports and the Internet. 
The study looked at the Basel Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, 
specifically board practices and senior management and its implementation.  The 
Basel Principles and corporate governance coursework previously completed will 
form the basis of the financial sector.  This as well as other documentary sources will 
be analysed in order to answer the research questions of the study.    
This study is an extension of work previously done. 
Scope and limitations of the study  
Due to time and resource constraints this research could not focus on a specific 
institution, however, this can be taken up in future research work. 
Attention was also given to the general principles, issues and challenges confronting 
the successful implementation of corporate governance in the business community. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Concept of Corporate Governance 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the concept of corporate governance against the background of the 
widely held view that both profit and non-profit making organisations should be bound by its 
values. It is, however, a matter of debate that the extent of successful implementation of 
corporate governance is not as clear in non-profit making organisations as it is in commercial 
organisations. To this end, this chapter explores the meaning of corporate governance; 
principles of corporate governance, such as democracy, accountability, fairness and 
transparency; and the difference between corporate governance and corporate 
management. The chapter concludes that the concept of corporate governance varies in 
substance and form from country to country. For example, issues concerning the levels of 
information disclosure and corporate transparency are balanced differently against issues of 
corporate oversight and control, depending on the country and the organisation involved. 
When addressing issues of corporate governance, three areas must be addressed:  firstly, 
the structure of the company; secondly, the membership of the company, i.e. who are the 
shareholders or stakeholders and thirdly the process used in implementing corporate 
governance.   
Corporate governance in the UK is based on a vastly “liquid” stock market, where  
organisations are measured by profits, market share, return on investments to name but a 
few. The legal system in the UK permits organisations widespread freedom to accumulate 
wealth on behalf of their shareholders in an environment of self-regulation. Formerly, there 
was insufficient guidance on the roles and responsibilities of boards in the discharge of their 
obligations to shareholders. In the 1980s the focus on corporate governance was brought to 
the forefront as a result of various corporate scandals.   
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Instead of legislating against the inadequacies, the government consented to self-regulation.  
As a result, the Cadbury Committee (1992) was borne out of investigations, which resulted in 
the increase of proponents of corporate governance.  Principles of good corporate 
governance which were contained in the Cadbury Committee’s Report were later embodied 
in a Code of Conduct.2  Cadbury looked at the financial aspects of corporate governance.   
Subsequently, further Codes were drawn up to counter scandals, e.g. Greenbury Report 
(1995) on executive remuneration, Hampel (1988) on broader governance issues, Turnbull 
looked at “internal control”, Higgs examined the roles of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), 
while, Smith looked at audit committees. These codes have been deliberated and received 
by the business sector and the financial community.3 
Although non-profit organisations practice corporate governance, the original codes were 
aimed primarily at listed companies, i.e. corporations.4  Technically, NPOs are not 
corporations, but there is nothing to prevent such companies from complying with the Codes 
aimed at profit-making organisations, if they so choose.   Corporate governance is therefore 
relevant in both profit and non-profit making organisations.  However, for the purposes of this 
chapter the focus will be on profit making organisations only. 
1.2 Meaning of corporate governance 
The fact that many businesses failed in the wake of global economic recession of 2008 
almost led to the belief that corporate governance is a new subject, which should be 
understood in the context of that recession. While the recession brought about dominant 
focus on the subject matter, it is a fact that corporate governance has indeed been 
associated with the conduct of businesses and therefore has existed across time and ages. 
                                                            
 
 
3 Stephen, Wilks, Boardization and Corporate Governance in the UK as a Response to Depoliticizatio and Failing Accountability, University 
of Exeter available at www.socialscienes.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/Wilks%20PPA%20Article.pdf 
4 A. Cadbury, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: A Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 
London, Gee & Co (1992), (Cadbury Report) para.3.1 
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Whatever meaning corporate governance is given largely depends on the context and many 
people have taken different angles to it.  According to Shleifer and Vishny corporate 
governance ‘deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment.’5  This is considered to be a very narrow 
definition as governance applies equally to all types of corporations and institutions.  In this 
regard, Sir Adrian Cadbury takes the view that corporate governance is ‘concerned with 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individuals and 
communal goals…the aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society.’6   
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the other hand, 
sees the subject in the context of relationships between a company’s board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders, stressing that ‘it provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining and communal goal those objectives, 
and monitoring performance, are determined.’7  Elements of good corporate governance 
include the provision of correct incentives for the board and its managers to attain its 
objectives in the interest of the company; shareholders putting in place effective monitoring.  
This increases the level of confidence necessary for a healthy market economy. 8 
From the above definitions, it is clear that corporate governance deals with how corporations 
are governed and controlled together with the practices and procedures, which are 
implemented to ensure the organisation achieves its objectives.  These objectives differ 
according to the nature of the organisation.  A public company raising capital by way of 
                                                            
5 C.A. Mallin, ‘Corporate Governance’, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (3rd ed.), p.7 
 
6 Ibid 
 
7 Ibid 
 
8 Philips, Heyes, Strengthening the corporate governance of financial institutions: A hopeless but necessary task?   February 
2012, denning.law.ox.ac.uk   
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issuing shares will have as one of its main objectives the maximisation of the investment of 
its shareholders and other stakeholders just as the objectives of non-profit making 
institutions are for the benefit of the community as a whole.  However, corporate governance 
applies not only to companies within the private sector but equally to those in the public 
sector.  The aim of good corporate governance is to minimise risks at all levels by 
implementing proper checks and balances, ensuring any abuse of power are kept to a 
minimum. In this context corporate governance can be understood as a system with different 
component parts, each part has a role to play and each component must work in harmony 
with the other to produce the desired outcome.  
1.3 Features of corporate governance 
There are four key principles used in implementing corporate governance, namely: 
democracy, accountability, fairness and transparency. Each element will be examined in 
detailed.         
(i) Democracy 
The concept of democracy relates to having a voice and being heard, i.e. the decision 
making process should reflect the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders. The 
board of directors is accountable to the shareholders who are responsible for electing them.  
In governance this means that the role of the board is to better represent the interest of 
shareholders and other beneficiaries.9 It is also in the interest of the shareholders to ensure 
that one person does not dominate the board.10 
In examining the structure and composition of a typical public company the board of 
directors is seen as the primary decision making body. According to the Cadbury Report the 
                                                            
9 C. Cornforth, ‘The Governance of Public and Non‐Profit Organisations: What do boards do: London, Routledge, 2006, p.9 
 
10 Cadbury Report, para, 4.2 
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responsibility of the board is to provide effective leadership and control.11 To be able to do 
so, the board of directors must be equipped with the essential skills and knowledge.12   
The composition of the board however, differs depending on whether it is a unitary or two-
tier board system.  In a unitary board system, predominant in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the United States of America (US), there is one single board consisting of executive 
directors, NEDs, a Chairman of the board and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  It is 
important to note that all are employees of the company except for the NEDs who are 
external and believed to be independent and objective.  It is often argued that as the role of 
Chairman is crucial towards implementing corporate governance and smooth working of the 
board, as such should be separated from that of CEO.13  
A two-tier system on the other hand, consists of a supervisory board and a management 
board with distinct separation of supervision and management.  Shareholders choose 
members of the supervisory board who in turn select the management boards. The 
supervisory board keeps an eye on the way the business is run by the management board. 
This can lead to asymmetries of information between managers and shareholders14 and it is 
a system that operates largely in European Union in particular Germany and Sweden. This 
system is hierarchical in the sense that they are governed from top down as opposed to the 
bottom-up approach of the unitary system.   
In practice however due to the hierarchical nature of board structures, particularly those 
operating within a unitary board system employees role within the decision making process 
is very limited.  An example of a profit-making corporation, which has successfully 
implemented corporate governance, is the John Lewis Partnership (John Lewis), which 
                                                            
11 R. Hampel, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report, London Gee & Co (1998) para. 2.3 
 
12 B. Coyle, Corporate Governance, Icsa Publishing, 2010, p.21 
 
13 Cadbury Report, para. 4.5, See also UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 
 
14  Cadbury Report, para. 4.5 
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includes Waitrose, a leading retail business in the UK.  The success of John Lewis is 
attributed to the vision of the founder, John Spedan Lewis of a business powered by its 
people.15 An essential feature of John Lewis is the involvement of the employees in the 
decision making process of the company. Every employee is a partner of John Lewis and 
are involved in the decision making process of the organisation. The partnership is governed 
by a written Constitution.16 Democracy plays an important part in the process of governance 
giving every partner a say in a business that they own together, each having a single vote. 
Also of equal important is the structure of the company, which is considered to be horizontal 
(i.e. everyone involved in the process of governance at the same level). There are three 
governing bodies, consisting of: the Partnership Council, the Partnership Board and the 
Chairman.  The Council is responsible for electing the four Trustees who serve as Directors 
and the four members who serve on the Committee for Management.17   All the partners of 
John Lewis share in the ‘knowledge, reward and profits’ of the company. Advantages of this 
system include loyalty from the employees and a successful business, with everyone 
working together in unity for a common purpose.    
Under the Chairmanship of Charlie Mayfield by involving its shareholders in the process of 
corporate governance, did not leave its implementation solely up to the board of directors.    
      (ii) Accountability 
There is no universally agreed definition of accountability. The idea however, is that those 
responsible for the decision-making of the company must be accountable for their decisions 
and actions.  Systems must be in place to effectively allow for accountability and provide 
                                                            
15 The Constitution of the John Lewis Partnership: Introducing, Principles and Rules, December 2011, John Lewis/Waitrose, 
available at: www.johnlewispartnership.co.uk/about/waitrose.html (last accessed 4th July 2012) 
 
16 Ibid 
 
17 Ibid 
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investors with the means to examine the actions of the board and its committees. This 
increases the level of trust and confidence in the organisation.18  
The Cadbury Report stated that the Board is accountable to shareholders for the progress of 
the company. Shareholders in turn appoint auditors to provide external checks on directors’ 
financial statements.19 Members of the board are accountable to shareholders and other 
stakeholders both present and future.  Therefore it is expected that the board must give 
proper account of its activities in terms of full disclosure about audited accounts, 
remuneration and governance of the organisation and be transparent in the way it operates 
and controls the organisation.  
The board of director owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders because of the proximity of 
the relationship; however, this does not apply where the director is also a shareholder.  
Boards are under a legal obligation (in their position of trust) to act in the best interests of the 
organisation.  Its powers and duties are usually laid out in the company’s constitution, which 
defines the nature of the governing body as well as the rights and duties of its members. The 
Companies Act 2006 codified directors’ duties to include amongst other things, duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence, formulating strategies, policymaking and 
supervision of the management team. This is to ensure that there is a system of checks and 
balances and clear separation of powers with no one person having ‘unfettered powers’.20  
One concern is that the board is unlikely to be free from conflict of interests, which in effect 
may undermine any process of accountability. Jensen and Meckling who represent agency 
theory sees directors as agents and shareholders as principals21 and as such, the concept of 
separation of ownership and control gives rise to conflict of interest between the board and 
                                                            
18  
 
19 Cadbury Report, para.6.1 
 
20  Ibid, para.1.2 
 
21 C. Mallin, p.14 
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shareholders.22 Agency theory assumes that the shareholders and board of directors will 
have different interests.23  It is the view of agency theory that the fact that shareholders are 
not involved in the day-to-day operations of the business may give rise to inequality in the 
information they have access to, as opposed to the directors. This can lead to several 
identifiable problems. Firstly, abuse of powers by the board acting in its own interest as 
opposed to the best interest of the shareholders as principals. There is a tendency to take 
excessive risks, which may run contrary to that of the shareholders.24 It is therefore 
important that proper systems are put in place for the monitoring of the activities of the board 
in order to prevent any abuse of power, resulting in protecting the interest of the 
shareholders.25  The Cadbury Report further stated that shareholders could insist on a high 
standard of corporate governance by requiring their companies to comply with the Code.26 If 
shareholders play a more active role in the process this may go some way in addressing the 
weaknesses in the current process.  It is important to note that agency problem only arise 
where the director is not a shareholder and the common practice is that most directors are 
also shareholders.   
The long held view is that the role of NEDs is crucial in relation to accountability.  They are 
perceived as custodians, as stated in Equitable Life Assurance v Bowley & Ors27, which 
concerned action against former directors and non-executives directors for breach of 
fiduciary duties.  The two main functions of NEDs are to review the actions of the board and 
its executives in relation to their performance, strategy, standard of conduct and key 
                                                            
22 J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers, L. Renneboog, Corporate Governance Regimes, Convergence and Diversity, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 386 
 
23 C. Cornforth, p.7 
 
24 C. Mallin, p.15 
 
25 Ibid 
 
26 Cadbury Report, para.6.6 
 
27 [2003] EWHC 2263 (Comm) 
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appointments and where conflict of interest arise to take the lead.28 The Cadbury Report 
recommended that NEDs must be experts in their field, commanding the respect of the 
Executive and be able to work together cohesively to further the interest of the organisation.  
In selecting NEDs, the same level of care is required as those used in appointing senior 
executives.29  A key role of NEDs is to be able to hold the executive to account.30   As a 
result they need to have the necessary skills and time to be able to have a sound grasp of 
the organisation in order to exert any real power and influence in governance.31  For NED’s 
to be effective they will need to be properly informed but there is a concern that as they are 
external and are not involved in the day-to-day running of the corporation, they may not have 
access to necessary information in a timely fashion. The board should ensure that all 
material information about the company is available in an accurate and timely manner.  
The effectiveness of NEDs is based on the quality and use of the information they receive,32 
for which they are reliant on managers.  If not, this will impede their performance and affect 
their ability to exert any real power of holding the executive to account.  The Warwick study 
highlighted this as a problem and questioned whether this is realistic.33   Their view is that 
the role can be compromised by familiarity and result in complacency, and their ability to 
remain objective is being questioned.34  While it is vital for NEDs to be properly involved in 
the organisation in order to have a solid grasp and understanding, which will in turn enable 
them to be more effective, too much involvement may compromise their objectivity.35  In the 
event of conflict of interest NEDs are expected to take the lead in resolving the issues but if 
                                                            
28 Cadbury Report, paras.4.5‐4.6 
 
29 Ibid, para. 4.15 
 
30 C. Cornforth, p.215 
 
31 Ibid 
 
32 Cadbury Report, para. 4.14 
 
33 C. Cornforth, p.215 
 
34 Ibid 
 
35 Ibid, p.215 
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their independence and objectivity are compromised this may adversely affect the 
implementation of effective corporate governance. 
The Combined Code 2010 is also in favour of a board structure comprising mainly NEDs of 
at least half of the board, the idea being to bring a balance to the board although collectively 
they are responsible for the success of the company.36  However, Lord Turner in a review of 
the banking crisis for the Financial Services Authority (FSA) doubted the contribution of 
NEDs because of their lack of knowledge.37  Whereas, Sir David Walker in his report raised 
the question whether the long held belief that NEDs made a significant contribution to 
governance remains as practical as previously thought.38 
There is clearly a need to have a proper ‘balance’; however, this may be easier said than 
done.   
   (iii) Fairness 
The concept of fairness refers to the premise that all stakeholders should receive equal 
treatment, i.e. they play by the same set of rules where there is no outside interference.  For 
example, the rights of minority shareholder should be upheld in the same way as that of 
majority shareholders.   
The OECD issued guidelines dealing with the ‘equitable treatment of shareholders.’ Within 
those guidelines are three principles directed at promoting fairness. Firstly, equal treatment 
for all shareholders of the same class.  Secondly, it prohibits insider trading and abusive self-
dealing. Thirdly, board members and executives are required to disclose any direct or 
indirect material interest in any transactions or other matters affecting the corporation.39 
                                                            
36 C. Mallin p. 163 
 
37 The Turner Review, A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, March 2009, para.2.8 
 
38 Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities, Final recommendations, 
November 2009, para.2.2 (Walker Review) 
 
39 OECD Principles on Corporate Governance, 2004, p.20 
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They further recommended that all shareholders should have the opportunity of obtaining 
effective redress in the event of violation of their rights.40 In the UK, Company law protects 
minority shareholders’ rights and therefore the risks are minimized. Although in other 
jurisdiction this is not always the case. An example of the legal protection afforded to 
minority shareholders was mentioned for the first time in the case of Foss v Harbottle.41 This 
issue was later addressed on appeal in O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others,42 a case 
decided under sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985. It considered the scope and 
remedies of a minority shareholder who believed that the company conducted its affairs in a 
way, which was unfairly prejudicial to their interest. 
This provision is now codified in section 994(1) of the Companies Act 2006.43  
It is important to note however, the diversity of shareholders, ranging from the larger 
institutional investors to individual investors but for the purposes of this research will not be 
explored. 
     (iv) Transparency 
Transparency is the ease with which outsiders can understand the actions of the 
organisation and its structure.  In governance it is concerned with whether the information 
presented by the company reflects its true position.  
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ‘transparent’ is ‘easily seen through, 
recognised, understood, or detected, manifest, evident, obvious, clear.’44  Transparency has 
been and remains the most challenging and controversial principle in the successful 
implementation of corporate governance for profit-making organisations.  The aim of 
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transparency is to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of all relevant matters, including the 
financial situations, performance, ownership and control of the corporation.  Some corporate 
scandals have highlighted that at the root of their failure is the lack of transparency, for 
example, the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995, in which one individual managed to lose over 
£850 million.  Clearly there was insufficient supervision and a lack of proper internal 
controls.45 Transparency is the foundation for establishing trust.46 The aim of greater 
transparency is to restore investor confidence, which was damaged by some of the 
previously mentioned corporate collapses.  
Various Codes such as the Greenbury Report47 and the Cadbury Report, which establishes 
“Codes of Best Practice”, exist for boards to observe, giving guidelines and setting 
benchmarks on how best to achieve corporate governance.  While these Codes are aimed 
primarily at listed companies, it is hoped and recommended that other companies will also 
endeavour to meet their requirements.  The disadvantage is that companies can choose 
whether or not to comply with the codes.  There is however, a provision that any 
organisation, which does not comply with the codes, must give reasons for their non-
compliance.48  The reality is that banks which have collapsed including Northern Rock and 
Royal Bank of Scotland complied with the codes of corporate governance as confirmed by 
their published annual reports, yet these boards failed.  Among the reasons cited was lack of 
transparency.49  
 
                                                            
45 C. Mallin, p.2 
 
46 B., Hanningan, Board failures in the financial crisis ‐ tinkering with codes and the need for wide corporate governance 
reforms: Part 1, Comp. Law, 2011, 32(12), 363‐371 
 
47 The Greenbury Committee was set up due to concerns about the size of remuneration of directors’ packages and the 
inconsistencies in relation to disclosure in the annual report of their company. 
 
48 Ibid, p.28 
 
49 Ibid 
 
 
 
22 
 
1.4 Differences between corporate governance and corporate management 
While governance consists of a governing body, i.e. the board of directors or trustees 
directing the management on all aspects of a company, it is the governing body that 
oversees the overall function of an organisation.  They are also responsible for appointing 
management personnel to whom power is delegated to administer the policies and 
procedures of the organisation in accordance with the wishes of the governing body 
The responsibilities of governance include choosing senior executives, evaluating their 
performance, authorising plans/commitments and evaluating the organisation’s performance.  
On the other hand, management has the responsibility for managing and enhancing the 
overall performance of the organization.  Management has the responsibility to implement 
the day-to-day operations of the operation. 
Governance sets the vision of an organization, translates it into policies, management is 
concerned with making decision for implementing those policies. 
Governance provide the direction, leadership and oversight of the functioning of the 
management, however, it has no role in the actual management. 
1.5     Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the concept of corporate governance and some of its key principles 
and argued that corporate governance differs from country to country.  Also, that the level of 
implementation of corporate governance between profit and non-profit making organisations 
varies because of the different structures of the various companies, their memberships and 
the processes used in implementing corporate governance. There is no uniform approach in 
the way corporate governance is implemented, even within the same sector and each 
company has its own system, including implementing their own Codes of Best Practice. 
The fact that businesses collapse as a result of bad corporate practices rationalises and 
indeed reinforces the need for corporate governance to be enforced in both commercial and 
non-commercial enterprises. The principles of democracy, accountability, fairness and 
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transparency are critical toward delivering the goods that come with the reality that 
businesses which survived many turbulent times got wiped out during the recent global 
recession, something which helps to drive home the point that board decision making was 
not what it might have been. While it is important to note that corporate governance can 
define issues, the way that board behaves is all that counts. After all, the Highway Code 
does not stamp out bad driving and so it is inconceivable that corporate governance 
eliminates failure completely.  
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Chapter 2 
Difficulties in achieving corporate governance by profit-making organisations 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter I examined corporate governance and its components, in its traditional application in 
relation to profit-making organisations. 
This chapter looks at board composition within the profit-making organisation (PMOs) and 
non-profit making organisations (NPOs) and examines their similarities and differences.  It 
compares the primary objectives of PMOs and NPOs and examines some of the difficulties 
in achieving corporate governance by PMOs. This requires an examination of some of the 
organisational structure and different corporate governance models in the private and public 
sector.    It also identified some of the strengths of NPOs in implementing corporate 
governance. In this research, NPOs refers to charities, non-profit organisations and other 
types of organisations not operating for profit. 
The principles of corporate governance apply equally to public and private sector 
organisations, regardless of whether their governing bodies are elected or appointed, or 
whether there is one individual or a group.50  
2.2 Comparing the primary objectives of PMOs and NPOs 
Globally, there are various models of corporate governance in operation.  Reason attributed 
for this is that this is an indication of how organisations are financed and also the different 
legislative controls and the external regulations governing them.51  
                                                            
50 Governance in the Public Sector:  A Governing Body Perspective PDF International Public Sector Study IFAC Public Sector 
Committee  August  2001  Study  13,  para,  .062,  available  at:  www.ifac.org/sites/default/publications/files/study‐13‐
governance (accessed 08.09.2012) 
51  John,  Fisher,  UnconfuseU  Corporate  Governance  and  Management  of  Risk,  White  Paper  2010  available  at: 
http://www.best‐management‐practice.com/gempdf/Corporate_Governance_and_Management_of_Risk.pdf  (accessed 
11.09.2012) 
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Within different jurisdictions regulators have created diverse ways to regulate organisations 
with a view to protecting assets, increase revenue and earning capacity and boost the 
market economy. Examples of governance models include: 
1. The Anglo-American model is the most widely used and its shareholders are the 
main stakeholders, to whom the boards are accountable.  How they perform 
internally, i.e. profit maximisation, and how they operate within the confines of the 
legal structures and regulations are geared at achieving these objectives. 
 
2. The Franco-German model perceives an organisation as a “collective entity” who has 
duties and responsibilities towards their principal stakeholders.  Within this model, 
shareholders are not the principal stakeholders; they are just one of many.  
 
3. The Japanese model (“keiretsu”) is based on a framework of inter-relationship 
between large banks and organisations who engage in widespread “cross-
shareholding”.  An advantage of this system is development of long-term stable 
relationship. There has been an increase in foreign acquisitions and “global 
competition”52 
The Board composition, similarities and differences 
Boards are responsible for setting the long-term vision and safeguarding the reputation of 
the organisation.  Good governance is Indispensable to the success of an organisation, and 
the effectiveness of a board is underpinned by the structures and procedures adopted, 
regardless of the sector.53  The legal composition of the governing boards in PMOs is based 
on company law and other related legislations.  
The non-profit sector is wide and varied ranging from well-known organisations to small 
informally run associations. As their sizes are diverse so are their functions.   A variety of 
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legal structures exist for NPOs, e.g. trusts, mutual societies, co-ops, companies limited by 
guarantee, church ministries and Charitable Incorporate Organisations (CIOs).  No single 
Code of Governance can reasonably be expected to apply equally to all organisations 
because of their different objectives, governance models and sizes.  However, in spite of 
their diversity, certain characteristics differentiate NPOs from PMOs, for example: 
• They are voluntary organisations, formed by the general public as opposed to 
government institutions; 
• They exist to fulfil a social and public benefit element;  
• They are prohibited from advancing self-interest or amassing personal wealth;   
• Their revenue must be applied for the benefit of the general public; 
• They can be legally formed by mutual consensus of at least three people; 
• On termination, surplus assets must be allocated to NPOs with similar objectives.  
 
There is a requirement that the governing body of NPOs must consist entirely of people 
having the ability to govern it, with an interest in its objectives and provide strategic forward 
planning of the organisation, overseeing management’s administration of its objectives. 
Depending on its mission, history, and geographical link, NPOs may also have specific 
stakeholders or different groups of stakeholders, some or all of whom may be represented 
by categories of board members under the organisation’s regulations.   The governing body 
of PMOs do not purport have to have an interest in the aims and objectives of the 
company.54 
One essential aspect of board structure is the selection of the various board committees, 
e.g. within PMOs, the audit and remuneration committees etc.  Board committees vary for 
both PMOs and NPOs, depending on the organisation’s size, its structure and its objectives, 
e.g. within NPOs, standing committees, investment committees and facilities committees.    
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The purpose of the committees is to act as a system of checks and balance on the operation 
of the board. 
The Chairman and CEO  
The Chairman plays a vital role in implementing good corporate governance.  They are 
responsible for the effective operation of the board, while the CEO is responsible for leading 
and managing the organisation.55 
Auditors 
According to some auditors act as “gatekeepers”56, however, this analogy is incorrect. The 
Oxford Dictionary defines “gatekeeper” as an attendant employed to control who goes 
through a gate...a person or thing that controls access to something.”57 Their function is 
much wider than simply manning the gates and providing information.  Auditors’ 
responsibility is to supply shareholders with an “external and objective check” on the 
financial statements of the director.  According to the Cadbury Report, the annual audit is 
one of the “cornerstones of corporate governance”.58  Although the director’s reports are 
addressed to the shareholders, they are essential to a broader audience, especially its 
employees whose interests boards have a statutory duty to consider.59 
Within the NPO sector, the board is responsible for directing the company.  They are known 
by many names, e.g. Board of Trustees, Board of Directors, Board of Governors 
Management Committee.  For the sake of simplicity, however, they will be referred to as “the 
board”. 
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In many ways the governance board of NPOs and PMOs are similar but for their attitudes: 
the board’s oversight role, its decision-making power, its structural position within the 
organisation, and its members’ fiduciary duties. The similarities end, however, where 
shareholder interest in maximising returns rank in priority over the fulfilment of the NPO’s 
objectives, its diversity of stakeholders, the more complex business models, and self-
accountability rather than external accountability.60 
The role of governing boards, in NPOs, however, is not always clearly defined.  In 
government-run NPOs the board is perceived as public servants.  They manage the 
organisation for the purpose of the best interests of the general public (which is usually set 
out in its mission statement and/or other governing documents). Conversely, in PMOs, the 
board act as agents for the shareholders, however, this does not apply where the director is 
a shareholder.  They oversee the day-to-day management of the company and its 
objectives. 
It would appear that board members of NPOs are able to develop the organisation’s 
relationship with the donors and must carry out their role in a manner which will not conflict 
with the board’s duties.   
All NPOs are subject to governmental control.  In the United Kingdom, the Charity 
Commission is the governmental body which regulates non-profit making bodies and 
accounting principles by the Audit Commission).  They are under pressure to meet 
performance targets but some are restricted by political bias. However, donors may show 
their disapproval of the Board by removing their support (fiscal or otherwise).  In the 
likelihood of failure of profit-making organisations, losses are incurred by the owner, while 
failure may result in NPOs, Government and non-Government run ventures being bailed out 
                                                            
60 H. B. Hansmann, The Role of Non‐Profit Enterprise, 1980 
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and losses absorbed. Responsibilities are usually enshrined in legislation and their 
governing documents.61 
Guidelines for the voluntary sector setting out good practice can be found in “Good 
Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector (“the Codes”)” and sets out 
the responsibilities of charity trustees.  They identify 6 principles which are aimed at 
voluntary and community sectors worldwide.  Its application will differ, however, depending 
on the type and size of the organisation.62 
The success of PMOs is ultimately measured by the level of the return on its investment, i.e. 
profit maximisation.  PMOs purport to offer a good return for their investors.   Increased 
profits attract investors, resulting in greater economic stability. In this regard, one would 
conclude that the primary objective of PMOs is to maximise profit.  
Due to legal constraints NPOs are prevented from distributing additional revenue by way of 
profit to management or the governing body, including trustees.  There should be no direct 
link between the control of its operation and its distribution of profits. Profits are used to 
advance its public interest objectives.  On dissolution, surplus assets are not distributed to its 
members, but are transferred in accordance with legal requirements set out in its governing 
documentation.  NPOs consist of a wide range of unrelated organisations from the arts to 
health care, charities, churches and local authority leisure services, to name but a few.63  
The primary objective of NPOs is not profit maximisation (which is seen as a means to an 
end). The end is perceived as the organisation fulfilling its public interest/benefit objective.  
Profit is of course, important as they must be profitable in order to attract donors.  The reality 
is that they are not prevented from making a profit, but are legally restricted in distributing 
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it.64 Such profits must be ploughed back into the organisation in order to fulfil its objectives. 
In spite of the public interest element, however, NPOs may choose one venture over another 
because of its propensity to generate profit.  Equally, PMOs may fail to identify and capitalise 
on socially advantageous investments which generate increased public benefits rather than 
profit, if profits are not deemed sufficient to justify its investment costs.65 
Finance is necessary for NPOs for the following reasons: 
• Donors expect the cause they support to make a profit to justify its existence and to 
fulfil its objectives, e.g. feeding the homeless. 
• Profit increases the organisation’s ability to perform its objectives, just as much as 
the distribution of profit to shareholders becomes a strong influence to increase the 
share price on the Stock Market, attracting more investors or provide an impetus for 
existing shareholders’ continued or increased investment.66   
 
There is a growing consensus among those who control PMOs that these organisations 
should not only serve the best interests of the organisation, but also that of its stakeholders, 
e.g. employees, customers, suppliers (including the local community in which the 
organisation is situated).67 
2.3 Difficulties in implementing corporate governance by PMOs 
In order to assess how corporate governance is implemented within the profit making sector, 
it is necessary to analyse the application of the principles of corporate governance, namely, 
democracy, accountability, fairness and transparency. 
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The framework for corporate governance with the UK functions at various levels, through 
legislation, in particular the Companies Act 2006; the Listing Rules, the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules and the Prospectus Rules which emanate from and implemented by the 
Financial Services Authority; the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Financial 
Reporting Council’s UK Stewardship Code for institutional shareholders, the Takeover 
Panel’s Code, to name a few.  
Democracy 
As discussed in Chapter 1, we have seen that the board is the primary decision-making body 
responsible for implementing corporate governance, and that its decision-making should 
reflect the interest of the stakeholders. The majority of shares in listed companies are now 
owned by institutional shareholders i.e. pension funds, insurance companies and mutual 
funds etc.  Institutional investors are not generally involved in the decision making process.  
One reason is that they are not motivated to as their primary objective is profit maximisation 
and they are not usually interested in the decision making process.  Therefore, on the face of 
it, the boards could not be construed as truly democratic. 
There is a correlation between corporate governance and democratic governance of 
institutions. For there to be true democracy, other stakeholders, especially employees must 
be encouraged to participate in the decision-making process, i.e. corporate governance. This 
will result in loyalty, without which, there cannot be effective corporate governance. 
Accountability 
This section will focus mainly on shareholders duty in relation to accountability. The directors 
are elected by the shareholders (i.e. the owners) and are therefore accountable to them for 
the organisation’s progress.  They act as stewards on behalf of the shareholders.  The 
shareholders also appoint external auditors to oversee the organisation’s financial reports.68  
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (which replaced the Combined Codes) requires 
annual re-election of all FTSE 350 company directors.  When selecting and appointing board 
members, due regard should be had to the diversity of the applicants, whose skills, 
experience and independence (including gender) must be taken into account.69  The board 
owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders.   
Fiduciary duty is a common law creation.   This was first mentioned by the courts in the case 
of Foss v Harbottle.70  In this case, the courts decided that in actions where a wrong is 
alleged to have been done to a company, only the company itself has the locus standi. 
There are now, however, many exceptions to this rule.  In case law, a fiduciary is defined as 
‘someone who has undertaken to act for and on and on behalf of another in a particular 
matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence’.71 The Law 
Commission defined a fiduciary relationship as one where there is ‘discretion, power to act, 
and vulnerability’.72  It is said that vulnerability arises when the agent in receipt of the funds 
has greater knowledge/expertise than the agent placing the funds.  In this regard, 
vulnerability is closely linked with information asymmetry.73 
One vital aspect of accountability is for shareholders, as owners, to be able to effectively 
hold the board to account. 
Most shares in listed companies are owned by institutional shareholders.  As such, they 
have great power to influence the board and are able to affect the standard of governance. 
For example, in the US, institutional shareholders hold more than 60% of voting shares of 
the larger organisations.74  Their use of this power, however, depends largely on whether 
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they see this as their responsibility, as owners, to effect the change required rather than 
disposing of their shares whenever they perceive there to be a potential problem.75  It has 
been said that many institutional shareholders do not perceive themselves as the “ultimate 
owners” of the investments they make.  On the other hand, institutional investors may not 
see corporate governance as a profit generating activity warranting the requisite time and 
effort needed to vote appropriately.76 
Historically, in the UK the large institutions dominated shareholding, who had long term 
investments in both the shareholder and the organisation to be acquired and could therefore 
consider the benefits of the investment.  Today, there appear to be an increase in those 
whose only interest is “rapid, profitable exit.”77 Many do not hold shares long enough to be 
able to participate in corporate governance. 
The UK’s independent regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) published the UK 
Stewardship Code in 2010. Its purpose is to improve the   standard of engagement between 
institutional investors and organisations in order to assist in advancing “long-term returns to 
shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities.”78  The principle of 
“comply or explain” in the corporate governance since the Cadbury Report 1992 is that a 
mandatory requirement.  While it appeared to operate satisfactorily, it has been stated that 
the European Commission was concerned about this principle, in particular on the basis that 
“explanation, when given is sometimes thin.”79 The FRC, however, has issued a report on 
what comprises an ‘explanation’. The FRC’s guidelines for good practice recommends that 
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institutional investors should seek to engage with “investee companies” on a “comply or 
explain” basis and believe that this is the standard to which institutional investors should 
aspire.80  UK authorised asset managers must report on whether they apply the Stewardship 
Code or not.81 
The issue for corporate governance is how best to strengthen the board of directors’ 
accountability to its shareholders.82  The shareholders should insist on a high standard of 
good corporate governance which is a significant test of the directors’ stewardship role.83 
The board and its committees must be accountable for their actions and decisions in 
providing investors with mechanisms to examine them.  The boards’ accountability to the 
shareholders could be reinforced if shareholders insisted that the board adhered to the 
Code.84 
Institutional shareholders have been criticised for not actively adhering to the principles of 
the Stewardship Code.  Further concerns made are: (i) the failure of shareholders to bring 
“underperforming or poorly managed companies to account.”85 
The role of NEDs in accountability is crucial in the governance process, as previously 
discussed in Chapter I. From the outcome of the various inquiries86, this is an area which is 
proving difficult for the board.  
Concerns have been raised regarding the appointment of NEDs, e.g. by a board committee 
with considerable influence from the Chairman, which generally results in the board’s 
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composition being ineffective and not able to challenge executive decisions.   Further issues 
relate to lack of diversity in non-executive appointments, including, appointment of women 
and NEDs holding the same position on many boards which may result in their inability to 
fulfil their obligations.87    
Fairness 
All stakeholders should receive equal treatment, e.g. the rights of the minority shareholder 
versus those of majority shareholders. Within the UK, this does not pose a problem.  
Company law and other legal remedies provide adequate protection for shareholders.  As 
discussed in Chapter I.  In an interview with Dr Roger Barker,88 his concern was not about 
the rights of minority shareholders, rather the issue was one of getting them to fulfil their 
responsibilities.  Dr Barker’s recommendation was for minority shareholders to exercise 
more responsibilities in governance and play more of an active role.  He recognised that, 
within other jurisdictions, minority shareholder’s rights lacked adequate protection, especially 
in organisations where there are dominant block shareholders.  In these circumstances, 
minority shareholders would feel vulnerable and there is a need to address that vulnerability, 
partly through legal protection. 
Transparency 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of transparency is to ensure timely and accurate 
disclosure of all relevant matters, including the financial state of affairs, performance 
ownership and control organisations.  Transparency is defined by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (“Basel Committee”) as “public disclosure of reliable and timely 
information that enables users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a 
bank’s financial condition and performance, business activities, risk profile and risk 
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management practices.”89 The various corporate scandals mentioned earlier, have 
highlighted that one of the primary causes is lack of transparency. Although the OECD 
Principles appear to be adequate, the issue of implementation remains a challenge.  While 
regulatory framework is in place to enhance good corporate governance, PMOs, in pursuit of 
their primary objectives, i.e. profit maximisation may well compromise governance 
standards. As the regulations are suggestive (i.e. comply or explain) rather than mandatory 
the tendency to flout the regulations either by “cherry picking” or operate unethically in order 
to meet their objectives.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
In the context of corporate governance, transparency can be better achieved by having 
systems in place which enable those with vested interest in the corporation to have free and 
open access to material information on the organisation, such as, financial statements, 
budgets and the decision-making process. However, the information, in particular, those 
relating to the organisation’s financial situation must be clear and unambiguous, honest and 
reflect its true financial position. 
The aim of the EU Transparency Directive90 is to ensure “a high level of investors’ 
confidence through equivalent transparency for securities issuers and investors” within the 
European Union.  It is a requirement of the Directive that issuers of securities traded on 
regulated markets produce “periodic” financial details relating to the performance of issuer 
during the accounting year and continuous reporting on “major holdings of voting rights”91. 
Both the Cadbury Report and the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance highlighted 
the requirement for transparency and disclosure of a company’s independently verified 
financial statements.  The Cadbury Report highlighted the need for open and honest 
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financial reporting.  Additionally, there is a recommendation that the relationship between the 
board and auditors be sufficiently detached in order to maintain the latter’s “professional 
objectivity”92.  A further suggestion made is for auditors to be compulsorily rotated in order to 
deter familiarity between the board and auditors.93  
2.4 Identifying the strengths of nonprofits in achieving governance 
Research has identified that the two main areas which have proved difficult for PMOs in the 
implementation of corporate governance are: accountability and transparency.  We will now 
examine how NPOs measure up in the implementation of these two areas.  
Accountability  
There is no universally agreed definition of accountability. However, accountability may be 
defined as “a means of making public sector entities (politicians and officials) accountable to 
the “public” and is distinct from political accountability, for example, in situations of political 
accountability directly to the public (e.g., through an election), and managerial accountability, 
e.g. an official’s accountability to their managers through the hierarchy up to the political 
leaders.94 GuideStar UK is a database which works in partnership with the Charity 
Commission providing information on UK charities. The public has direct access to important 
data on charities. The aim is to endorse accountability and transparency.95    
Public sector organisations have to assure a wider and more complex range of political, 
economic and social aims which subject them to a divergent set of external controls and 
influence.  They are also controlled by different rules of accountability to diverse 
stakeholders, differing from those of the private sector and its shareholders. 
                                                            
92 Cadbury Report, para. 5.7 
 
93 Ibid. 5.12 
 
94 Governance in the Public Sector:  A Governing Body Perspective PDF,  International Public Sector Study,  IFAC Public 
Sector Committee Study 13,  August 2001, para 142, (thereafter Public Sector Study 13)   available at  
www.ifac.org/sites/default/publications/files/study‐13‐governance, (accessed 12.09.2012) 
 
95 Ibid, p.63 
 
38 
 
Characteristics of public sector governance have been considered by the Nolan Committee.  
The Nolan Report identified and clarified seven common principles which should undergird 
public life.  This Report made a recommendation for public sector organisations to draw up 
codes of conduct consolidating these principles.  These are: selflessness; integrity; 
objectivity; accountability; openness; honesty; and leadership. 
These characteristics have been defined as the responsibilities of holders of public office.96 
There are however, various levels of accountability to which NPOs are subjected, such as:- 
(a) Statutory Accountability 
Effective governance which complies with all relevant statutes and regulations and best 
practice guidelines reduces the risk of fraud, negligence and other misbehaviours which 
have caused failures of many organisations.97  
Most NPOS have been established for specified objectives which are outlined in the 
documents of incorporation.  NPOs are accountable to their stakeholders to deliver directly 
or indirectly services to the public (nationally or internationally), to incur limited expenditure 
for specified purposes.  They are required to ensure that appropriate systems are in place to 
prevent them exceeding their powers or functions and encourage them to comply with any 
obligations imposed on them, whether by statute, regulations or best practice guidelines.98  
Social and environmental matters (e.g. the changing economy, generational interests) 
should be considered in the interests of fairness.99  
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Consequently, the governing bodies of NPOs should supply senior executives with specific 
responsibility to make sure that correct advice is given to them in order that they (the 
governing body) comply with their obligations.100  
Additionally, these governing bodies should set up pro-active systems to deal with 
anticipated events as well as post-incident action, to avoid the incidences of possible 
breaches of the law.101 
(b) Public spending 
Public money is money used to advance economic and social objectives for the welfare of 
the general public.  Therefore NPOs are accountable to the general public for the money 
spent on delivery of these objectives and implementation of the policies.102 
Appropriate arrangements must be put in place to safeguard public funds and resources 
which are to be “used economically, efficiently and effective, with due propriety and with the 
statutory or other authorities that govern their use”.103  
(c) Public Accountability 
NPOs are stewards of both the assets and funds assigned to them.  Therefore they are 
accountable to the general public for financial expenditure and any liabilities incurred in the 
delivery of their objectives, how the system is run and the quality of services they deliver.104 
By establishing an effective framework of internal control they are able to satisfactorily 
discharge their responsibility of “timely, objective, balanced” and unambiguous reporting to 
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beneficiaries and others with vested interests.105 Therefore, the governing body of NPOs 
must delegate to senior executives clear accountability to ensure correct advice is provided 
to them on all financial matters, the keeping of accurate financial records and accounts, and 
for maintaining an efficient mechanism of financial management.106 
The board acts as a group in the interests of its members and not individually.  Statements 
made by individual board members lack legal authority.  The exception is where an 
individual board member contributes to the final board product.  It is the board as a whole 
which has authority, e.g. passing an official motion at a meeting which has been properly 
constituted.  It speaks on behalf of the board with one voice.  Board decisions can only be 
changed collectively by the board, not by individual board members. 
Transparency 
A study carried out in the European Union107 recently, assessed the primary public and self-
regulatory initiatives of NPOs in relation to transparency and accountability across 27 
member states. Although the study was aimed at improving transparency and accountability 
in order to address the risk of NPOs being used as a channel for terrorist financing, the 
findings are relevant.  The study assessed the various strategies across the member states 
and identified the practices that have proven effective, with a view of sharing best 
practices.108  The most common trend identified was the endorsement of both accountability 
and transparency.109 The study identified more than 140 “self-regulatory and public 
regulations initiatives.110 The standards, that regulators impose takes various forms, 
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however, in most cases they are enshrined in laws, accompanied by “legal obligation”, 
ensuring they are met111. In addition to setting minimum standards most regulators also have 
in place measures ensuring those standards are continually met.  There are systems in 
place across Europe to encourage greater transparency. Within the non-profit sector much 
more has been done than in the profit making sector.  
In NPOs, transparency is more easily achievable because they are required to commit 
unequivocally to openness and transparency regarding all their activities.  The only 
exception is in circumstances where there is a need to preserve confidentiality.112 
One of the NPOs greatest strengths can be attributed to the fact that their decisions are not 
driven by profit, but by fulfilment of the public benefit objective(s).  
The table below highlights some comparables in governance between NPOs and PMOs. 
 Profit Non-Profit 
Structure Commercial Enterprise Public Bodies 
Primary 
Objective 
Profit maximisation Public benefit 
Democracy Limited Possible 
Accountability To Shareholders (limited) Disperse (possible) 
Fairness Fair Fair 
Transparency Limited Possible 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
111 Ibid 
112 Study on Recent Public and Self‐Regulatory Initiatives  
42 
 
Conclusion 
Although in many ways there are striking similarities in the governance boards of PMOs and 
NPOs, there are also marked differences. The objective of PMOs is profit maximisation 
whereas NPOs is that of public benefit.  In applying the various principles of corporate 
governance, i.e. democracy, accountability, fairness and transparency, democracy is limited 
within PMOs because of the lack of motivation on institutional shareholders to actively 
participate in the governance process.  
The area of accountability raises many concerns, including the board’s accountability to its 
shareholders which may result in conflict of interest.      
On the other hand, there are greater levels of accountability in NPOs because of the 
different stakeholders compared to PMOs who are only accountable to their shareholders.  
Based on the objectives of NPOs compared with their counterparts, it could be argued that 
the former’s success is measured differently from the latter and their decisions are not 
usually profit-driven. Their judgement is not clouded by focussing on profits; therefore NPOs 
do not have to compromise their standards. As long as the focus of PMOs is solely driven by 
profit maximisation they may never effectively implement corporate governance because 
there may be a tendency to compromise their standards.   
Corporate governance is not an absolute concept.  It does not have all the answers. The 
board alone cannot effectively implement corporate governance.  There is a requirement for 
other stakeholders to be involved in the process, otherwise we will continue to see corporate 
failures. 
For PMOs to successfully implement corporate governance requires a move away from the 
traditional organisational structure to the apparently successful horizontal structure in place 
at John Lewis where other stakeholders, mainly, employees play a more active role 
corporate governance. 
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The Board of PMOs, though they have the necessary skills and expertise, yet we still see 
high profile collapses and disasters of corporations.  The Board of NPOs on the other hand 
lack the necessary skills and yet they perform adequately well.  Provided the boards of 
NPOs are “enlightened” i.e. possess the necessary training skill and expertise then they 
would be able to implement corporate governance. 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Governance in Practice 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined some of the similarities and differences in governance in both 
sectors.  It also looked at some of the difficulties faced by PMOs in implementing 
corporate governance.  
This chapter examines corporate governance in practice by looking at examples of 
departures from corporate governance within the financial sector, namely, Enron 
Corp, WorldCom and Barings Bank. It will consider arguments to support why 
implementation of corporate governance may be possible by public entities and 
NPOs and the role of public awareness.  
While corporate governance failures are said to occur mainly in the banking sector, 
scandals due to governance failures have been reported within the commercial 
sectors among large organisations.    Reasons attributed to the failures include: 
fraudulent conduct, mismanagement, accounting irregularities and selfish ambitions 
among boards.  The extent to which failures in corporate governance played a role in 
the current financial crisis is inconclusive; however, what is certain is that the issue 
of corporate governance has been brought to the fore as a result of the recent 
financial crisis. 
The importance of good corporate governance is fundamental in order to gain and 
maintain confidence in the entire banking system.  Conversely, inadequate corporate 
governance may result in a bank’s failure leading to much wider macroeconomic 
repercussions, such as the risk of contagion.  
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The recent global economic crisis of 2007/2008 saw large scale failures of many 
well-known companies (including banks) in the UK, and also worldwide in particular, 
the US.  This negatively affected customer confidence which had a disastrous effect 
on the economic community as can be seen from the recent economic crisis. 
On the face of it, it would appear that the boards had complied with the relevant 
Codes of Corporate Governance, as confirmed by their Annual Reports.  However, in 
the UK the HM Treasury investigation concluded that there was “widespread 
corporate governance failures”113 by their boards, especially in regard to 
understanding and questioning their corporation’s “risk management processes”114.  
This suggested that they supervised extraordinary losses which occurred as result of 
“excessive leverage and risk taking…”115 amongst other things. 
The view taken by the European Commission is that at the heart of the crisis was the 
board’s failure in identifying, understanding and eventually controlling their exposure 
to risk.116 
The crisis arose as a result of self-interest and “compensation-culture” mentality of 
the Board and its CEOs, aided and abetted by shareholders.  Although previous 
structures were in place, these appear to be either overridden or disregarded by the 
board and CEOs based on incentives, which were geared to unnecessary risk-taking 
for the benefit of the board, fuelled by pressure from shareholders, rather than long 
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term investment for its customers. Common practices particularly among large 
investment banks were to pay huge bonuses as incentives for short-term gain.   
3.2.   Examples of departures from corporate governance within the financial 
sector 
It is widely recognised that failures in governance occurred mainly in the financial 
sector, in particular, the banking sector.  The reasons for failures in corporations 
such as Enron, WorldCom, Barings Bank Lehman Brothers include, fraudulent 
conduct, mismanagement, accounting irregularities – i.e. dubious business ethics on 
the part of the Boards, management’s aggressive drive for earnings and profits. 
Enron Corp 
A classic example of corporate governance failure is Enron Corp (Enron), formerly 
known as one of the most novel companies of the late 20th century.   Enron is now 
recognised as one of the largest governance failures of the 21st century. The 
organisation had internal control systems; however, these were circumvented by the 
conflict of interest which meant executives profited at the expense of 
shareholders.117    
In an apparent attempt to deceive the market by creative accounting, and cultivating 
the impression of greater credibility and financial liquidity than was the case; billions 
of shares were wiped, jobs were lost and so were savings and investments, including 
many pensions. Enron’s attempt at manipulating the markets was exposed, and as a 
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result, the market handed out the decisive sentence against them, which was 
harsher than any legislation could have done. Public disclosure of their deliberate 
avoidance of self-regulatory systems, “partnership arrangements” and fraudulent 
accounting systems used resulted in a lack of confidence and their ultimate demise.  
There appears to be no evidence of market failure.  On the other hand, the market 
performed as it was meant to do, responding positively to the reputation that Enron 
had cultivated.  Enron’s use of their reputation at first brought them the desired 
result.   
There appears to be no evidence that the regulations which existed at the time was 
inadequate to resolve the issues which arose. It may well be that further legislation 
which increased moral responsibility may well have inadvertently increased the 
likelihood of company failures and market volatility. 
Enron attempted to set itself up as a major player in the field of energy and in so 
doing, tried to avoid market regulations and bolstered its credibility through its “well-
documented failures in corporate governance, accounting and disclosure.”118  In 
attempting to do so, they sealed their own fate.119 
In the case of Enron one of the US largest scandals it would appear that, prima facie, 
it had all the systems in place for good corporate governance, including regulatory 
framework, however, corporate governance was not implemented.    If it was 
properly implemented any potential problems would have been detected at an earlier 
stage.  Management was allowed by the board to flout the codes, accounting 
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irregularities were not dealt with by the Audit Committee and there was failure by the 
auditors in the performance of their duties. 
The lack of transparency and accountability resulted in unethical accounting and 
disclosure practices which were ratified by the board and approved by auditors as a 
result of factors such as demands to meet quarterly forecasts and sustain share 
prices. 
In all these companies, governance failure arose as a result of self-interest and 
“compensation-culture” mentality of the Board and its CEOs.  The structures which 
were in place appeared to be either overridden or disregarded by the board and 
CEOs took unnecessary risks for their benefit rather than the benefit of its investors 
and other stakeholders. Common practices particularly among large investment 
banks were to pay huge bonuses as incentives for short-term gain.   
2. BARINGS BANK 
Barings Plc was one of the most established banks in the UK and on 26 February 
1995 was pronounced bankrupt as a result of “rogue trading” activities in Singapore 
by one of its employees, Nick Leeson.   His trading tactics was assumed to possess 
little or no risk exposure.  In his first year of his employment with Barings, he 
amassed wealth of approximately 10% of the bank’s profits.   As a result he was 
placed in a position of considerable trust and had “unfettered powers” to trade on the 
futures market, being in charge of both booking and reporting the day’s trade without 
supervision.   This meant he was solely in charge of checking whether the records 
tallied.  Consequently, he was able to cover his tracks, concealing the true financial 
status of his errors.   As a result, Barings Plc, formerly the Queen’s bank, lost over 1 
billion dollars ($1bn.) and was sold for an embarrassing one pound (£1). 
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Most of the organisations which have failed, including Enron and Barings were very 
large corporations which appeared to have effective governance systems in place.  
The challenge is, when an organisation becomes so large, how does one properly 
implement corporate governance? 
As a result of Enron Corp. three essential areas of inadequacies were identified and 
addressed in order to put in place a system for international public policy:  
1. Prior to their collapse in January 1995, Barings was perceived as a reputable 
bank of good standing.  Ironically, less than two months later, Receivers were 
appointed. Their “capital ratio” was over and above the 8 per cent required under the 
Basle Agreements.  This highlighted the inadequacy of the regulatory mechanism for 
“capital requirements”. 
2. Poor systems of internal controls were insufficient to sustain the actions of its 
traders; and 
3. Evidence revealed the lack of communication between regulators worldwide 
which would have in part addressed the asymmetry of information created by 
globalization. 
As a result, a new structure was formulated by the Basle Committee, giving banks 
the opportunity to utilise their own models of internal risk management, with regard 
to their capital.120 
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A common theme highlighted after most of the failures was the inability to manage 
risk. Risk management is defined as:  the identification, analysis, assessment, 
control and avoidance, minimization, or elimination of unacceptable risks.   
“An organisation may use risk assumption, risk avoidance, risk retention, risk 
transfer, or any other strategy (or combination of strategies) in proper management 
of future events.”121 
Several studies on risk management were carried out prior to the collapse of many 
large profile organisations. It has been suggested that financial risk management 
systems can fail in five ways:122 
(i) they can collapse, as is evidenced by companies such as Enron Corp, 
Barings Bank, WorldCom  etc. 
(ii) failure to utilise proper risk measurements 
(iii) inability to measure the level of known risks 
(iv) failure to take into account the dimension of known risks 
(v) failure to manage and effectively monitor risks  
Studies carried out in 2008 with 125 senior executives in the financial sector in the 
US revealed that roughly 72% of the participants voiced their concerns regarding the 
risk management practices of their own companies and its capability to comply with 
strategic plans.123  Likewise, a survey conducted in 2008 by the “Economist 500 
senior management” participants from worldwide top banks involved in risk 
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management highlighted flaws in risk management which added to the recent 
financial crisis, such as:  
• flaws in risk practices and governance;  
• senior executives and non-executive management lacked the 
appropriate level of risk experience and skills required;  
• a lack of influence of the risk function;  
• the  manner in which risk is assessed and reported;124 
• a culture of compensation intensely geared towards yearly profit 
maximisation. 
WorldCom 
After the discovery of considerable accounting irregularities, WorldCom, formerly the 
world’s second largest telecommunications company, filed for bankruptcy in 2002. 
Many of those in management have now been prosecuted.125 
It was found that most of the deviations from appropriate corporate conduct occurred 
as a result firstly, of failure by the Board of Directors to acknowledge and to pro-
actively take action to counter the “culture of greed” which was found to be endemic 
among the company’s senior executives; secondly, there was a complete failure by 
those responsible to discharge their fiduciary duties to shareholders; thirdly, there 
was a “lack of transparency” between Board of Directors and senior executives.  The 
Bankruptcy Examiner found there was “complete breakdown of the system of 
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corporate governance”.126  The very mechanisms designed to deter unprofessional 
conduct were completely disregarded. 
The judge presiding in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) trial in New 
York, recorded that the organisation “overstated” its income in the region of $11 
billion, its balance sheet by approximately $75 billion, resulting in losses in shares of 
around $250 billion.  Most of these losses were felt in the retirement funds of its 
employees 401(k).127 
As with Enron, WorldCom’s credibility was considerably improved in the 1990s as a 
result of a succession of acquisitions.  While on the face of it they looked successful, 
they were under great pressure to maintain high stock price levels, both to enhance 
further acquisitions and supply money-spinning backing for “executive stock 
options”.128  In order to do this, WorldCom had to meet the earnings projection 
required by Wall Street.   
In 2000 the US government did not approve a proposed merger with “Sprint” and at 
the same time the market’s interest in telecommunications was satiated.  As a result, 
management attempted to employ “aggressive” accounting practices to augment the 
true financial situation.  When these practices could no longer be used, management 
turned to false accounting entries to “make [up] the numbers” in order to maintain the 
earnings expectations of Wall Street.  While their records reveal that they met those 
targets, in reality, they failed to meet the targets “11 out of 13” quarters.  Their 
impropriety was exposed when internal auditors identified extensive unprofessional 
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conduct.  The company finally filed for bankruptcy and criminal proceedings began 
against senior executives.129 
It would appear that because of their size and apparent “success” those charged 
with the responsibility of governance (i.e. the board), especially the audit and 
compensation committee was dominated by two of WorldCom CEOs, who were 
more concerned with empire building. As a result, there was no due diligence on the 
part of the other board members and it simply became a “rubber stamp[ing]” exercise 
for the CEO’s decisions.130 
An argument has been made that the apparent inability to prevent repeated failures 
occurred as a consequence of flaws in the structure of corporate governance in 
publicly traded organisations.  There is a wrongly held assumption that corporate 
governance is an absolute concept and a panacea for bad management of 
organisations; that it can easily be implemented. In fact, even with corporate 
governance systems in place, bad management may still exist as a result of lack of 
implementation, e.g Enron and WorldCom.   
One of the issues raised in Enron is the “external” director’s potential liability for 
losses incurred by the organisation.   The director’s duty of oversight is an extension 
of the principle of duty of care.  Formerly, the director’s duty of care was in 
connection with specific decisions made by the board which, if their judgement was 
impaired, they were protected by the “business judgement rule” from incurring losses 
resulting from bad decisions.  On the other hand, the duty of oversight deals with the 
failure of the board to take action. 
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After Enron’s collapse major corporate governance reforms included a proposal by 
the New York Stock Exchange to revise its listing standards, as a result of its 
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee report of 2002; and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOA), which came into force on 30 July 2002 
recommended that the audit committee should be responsible for hiring, 
compensating and supervising external directors. They should put in place 
procedures to deal with the organisation’s accounting and audit functions.  To do so, 
they must have the appropriate powers and resources.131 
The SEC examined the full role of the board, including the Audit Committee, and the 
main focus was on the independence of the board. The recommendation was that 
the majority of the directors, nominating and compensation committee must be 
independent.  A director is considered independent if there is no “significant link”132 
with the organisation.   
Many of the scandals surrounding the collapse of many large companies, including 
Enron Corp. and WorldCom are linked together by either the eagerness of corporate 
managers to “inflate” financial results, either by exaggerating profits or to understate 
costs, by diverting company funds to the private uses of managers (i.e, to defraud 
the organisation).     
Some famous examples of fraudulent “earnings management” are (i) WorldCom’s 
intentional “misclassification” of as much as $11 billion in expenses as capital 
investments; (ii) Enron’s creation of off-balance sheet partnerships to hide the 
company’s deteriorating financial position and to enrich Enron executives.  There are 
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examples of worldwide managerial misdemeanours which raised fundamental 
questions about the impetus and incentives of business managers and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance worldwide.  
Investigations within the UK highlighted three areas of concern, which are: 
(a)  competent boards 
(b) Risk management procedures and principles 
(c) Mechanisms to deal with incentives and remuneration. 
The Walker Report made several recommendations, many of which have now been 
implemented in the UK and these underline areas where steps have been taken to 
reinforce governance. These are:- 
1. The size, composition and qualification of boards and its members 
2. The board’s function and performance evaluation 
3. The function of institutional shareholders; the Stewardship Code 
4. The importance of risk management procedures and independence of chief 
risk officers 
5. Remuneration practices 
 
In the UK, the FSA, through the SIF process, assess the suitability of individuals for 
the roles to ensure there is a qualified functional board and senior managers.  They 
ensure that the appointment process is “robust and rigorous”.  Both senior and non-
executive directors who hold key positions must be technically competent in order to 
perform their function. Adhere to governance practices for effective functioning and 
be supported by skilled, strong and independent risk and control operations for which 
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the board “provides effective oversight”.133  One criticism is that there are no set 
criteria for the appointment of the board of directors.  Therefore, board failure could 
be attributed to incompetent management. One of the key problems is the 
appointment of boards.  There are no set criteria.  The objectivity and independence 
required for effective boards appear to be lacking.   
An effective board is one that has a clear understanding of its business model, 
understands and focuses on its risks while at the same time being able to “challenge 
the executive on the execution of its strategic plan.”134  The Chairman role is to 
formulate a board that has the relevant technical skills and competence.  There must 
be a balance with particular focus on the material risks.   
3.3  Why implementation of corporate governance may be possible by public entities 
and non-profits organisations 
In an interview with Dr Barker, of the Institute of Directors, he gave two reasons why 
he did not believe NPOs implemented corporate governance better than their 
counterparts: (i) NPOs have only recently started developing Codes of Best 
Practices geared specifically for that sector and (ii) boards within that sector lacked 
the necessary professionalism and training. 
If NPOs were apparently operating well without the implementation of the Codes of 
Conduct without failures that is argument to support the view that NPOs are better 
able to implement corporate governance.  Secondly, if directors are “enlightened” i.e. 
receive the necessary training, then they will effectively implement corporate 
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governance.   It can be argued that because NPOs’ objectives are not profit-driven 
they may better implement corporate governance.   
 
3.4 The role of public awareness in corporate governance 
Business ethics 
Corporate governance failure is a real threat to the future of every organisation and 
the economy at large.  If corporate governance is perceived as the sum total of 
customs, practices, regulations and guidelines steering the way organisations are 
directed and controlled, then ethical business practices are the bedrock of corporate 
governance. Ethical standards must be implemented, observed and adhered to in 
order to effectively manage the interrelationships of the diverse stakeholders of 
organisations. 
Therefore, if those responsible for implementing corporate governance i.e. the board 
fail to discharge their obligations or permit others to do so, the long-term 
consequence would mean that the rights of those connected to the organisation i.e. 
its employees, customers, suppliers and the community would not be protected.   
The Institute of Business Ethics define business ethics as “is the application of 
ethical values to business behaviour”.  It relates to all facets of business relationship, 
e.g. employer and employee relationship, sellers and buyers, and accounting 
practices, extending over and above an organisation’s legal obligations is made up 
of a series of discretionary judgment and conduct directed by principles.135 
                                                            
135 Institute of Business Ethics, available at: http://www.ibe.org.uk/index.asp?upid=71&msid=12#whatbe    
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An organisation should be guided in the way it conducts its business affairs by its 
principle ethical standards and beliefs.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the way in which organisations responds to 
the “social and environmental impacts of its business operations” and its chosen 
involvement in the welfare of the economy in which it operates, both nationally and 
internationally.  In my opinion corporations do not necessarily owe social 
responsibility to society, as it is a wide concept, however, they have a duty to 
conduct their affairs in such a way which does not negatively impact on the society in 
which they operate.   This can only be achieved where business is conducted 
ethically. 
“Organisations must not only strive to be ethical, they must be seen to be ethical”.136 
An organisation applying core values such as integrity, trust and fairness are more 
likely to have economical lead in the marketplace. An organisation that practises 
good professional ethics are more likely to attract and maintain customer and 
employee loyalty.   
One definition of business ethics is “the application of a moral code of conduct to the 
strategic and operational management of a business”.   Good corporate governance 
can be accomplished by implementing a set of values and best practices built firmly 
on sound business ethics. 
While it is essential for organisations to generate profits in order to continue to exist 
and develop, the quest for profit maximisation must be balanced with sound ethics. 
                                                            
136 Terblanche ,Nic; Leyland, Pitt; Nel, Deon; Wallstrom, Asa   Corporate Governance and Business Ethics: Pictures of the  
Policies  available at  http://pure.ltu.se/portal/files/2740335/Article.pdf 
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There should be greater public awareness in the way PMOs conduct business. They 
must be more transparent in the way they operate.  There should be a system in 
place whereby the general public can scrutinise their actions, from the way boards 
are appointed to financial statements.  This will create a greater public awareness 
and increase public confidence.  Public awareness is about informing the general 
public.  PMOs do not operate in a vacuum – they are part of society and their 
decisions impact negative or positively on society, and as such, this information must 
not be shrouded in secrecy.     
3.5 Conclusion 
Although the OECD Principles are considered to be fairly adequate, its application is 
still a concern.  While there are sections of the Principles which require further 
development e.g. supervision of remuneration systems, risk management systems, 
and public disclosure of voting, the Principles continue to be extremely pertinent.  An 
apparent failure by policy makers and organisations stemmed from lack of its 
implementation.137   There are calls for mandatory compliance by way of legislation 
and regulation, which would enable improved implementation.   
There is a need to strike a balance. Legislation alone cannot resolve the flaws in 
corporate governance.  There is a need for organisations in both sectors to be 
proactive in improving governance standards. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance is important in that ultimately, it exist to hold boards and 
managers accountable.  It enhances their ability to make sound decisions by 
                                                            
137 Roger Barker, IOD 
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challenging management perspectives at board level. While corporate governance is 
not directly involved in the management of an organisation, effective governance 
structures have a significant role in improving the quality of management. 
The different elements of corporate governance depend on whether one is referring 
to structures or principles of governance.  In terms of structures, a key component of 
governance requires boards to take a reasonably independent view of what is in the 
organisations best interest, and conduct effective oversight of the company 
management, regardless of whether it is a profit-making organisation or not. 
There also need to be a chain of accountability over boards.  This accountability can 
be to other stakeholders whether they are shareholders or some other body, that 
effectively hold boards to account.   
In terms of principles of governance, accountability and transparency in the way 
organisations operate must be evident at all times. There need to be an awareness 
of conflicts of interests. The different players involved in governance require a 
continued awareness of the potential for conflicts of interests, so that the ultimate 
interests of the organisation is not distorted in any way as have been evident in high 
profile failures within the commercial sector. 
Corporate governance has evolved over the last 20 years, creating a more effective 
framework of governance although one continues to see corporate problems. There 
is still a long way to go.  It is work in progress. There remains an ongoing flow of high 
profile corporate scandals and disasters; the current financial crisis highlighted a lot 
of problems emerging in many organisations, which could be viewed as a failure of 
governance.   
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The challenges and issues arising depend on the country, and the specific type of 
organisations i.e. those issues facing large listed companies are very different to 
those facing small private companies.   What is common from the organisations 
looked at are:  (a) lack of transparency and accountability, (b) inadequate 
implementation, even with the correct systems in place; (c) conflicts of interests 
where boards make decisions that better suits their objectives rather than the 
organisation.   
 
The perception in many non-profit organisations particularly in charitable 
organisations is that corporate governance is at an early stage of development. This 
is true, especially in terms of the role of the board of directors/trustees.  Another view 
is that there is a lack of professionalism on the board of NPOs, i.e. that board 
members lack the necessary professional training required to fulfil their role.  
Recent efforts have been made to implement codes of governance for NPOs. Also 
the governance in such organisations tends to be more highly regulated.  In spite of 
this, NPOs appear to better implement corporate governance. 
Ultimately, the wider society is a stakeholder and should be regarded in some sense 
as a stakeholder of organisations whether they are profit-making organisations or 
not. Part of corporate governance is to establish the legitimacy of organisations in 
the eyes of society and so they are viewed by society as a whole as a reasonable 
organisation playing a valid role either directly or indirectly. Good governance should 
enhance that legitimacy.  Organisations should not operate in a vacuum, fulfilling the 
interest of a particular group of individuals, thereby narrowing its constituency and 
ignore the rest of society; no organisations should operate along those lines. 
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